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BIG ABORTION: WHAT THE ANTIABORTION
MOVEMENT CAN LEARN FROM BIG TOBACCO
Justin D. Heminger
Judge Casey's opinion in National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft'
epitomizes abortion law at the beginning of the twenty-first century.2 In
National Abortion Federation, Judge Casey considered the
constitutionality of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003'
(2003 Ban) in light of Stenberg v. Carhart.4 Judge Casey began by noting
that partial-birth abortion5 "has been described by many, including
Justices of the Supreme Court, as gruesome, inhumane, brutal, and
barbaric."6 Yet, fifty-five pages later, Judge Casey struck down the 2003
Ban . He conceded that "[w]hile medical science and ideology are no
more happy companions than [Roe v. Wade8 ] and its progeny have shown
law and ideology to be, Stenberg remains the law of the land. Therefore,
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author wishes to thank his parents for their support and to thank Daniel Z.
Herbst and Professor Helen Alvar6 for their guidance during the writing process.
1. 330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
2. See id. at 493.
3. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West Supp. 2004). President Bush signed the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (2003 Ban) into law on November 5, 2003. Pub. L. No. 108-105,
117 Stat. 1201 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West Supp. 2004)).
4. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 452-58 (detailing the facts and
opinions of Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)). In Stenberg, the Supreme Court
held by a five to four majority that a Nebraska statute prohibiting certain abortion
procedures was unconstitutional because it did not contain a health exception and because
it imposed an undue burden on women seeking abortions. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S.
914, 929-30 (2000).
5. Throughout this Comment, the term "abortion" refers to intentionally induced
abortion.
6. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 439. Among the 2003 Ban challenges in
the Northern District of California, Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp.
2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004), the District of Nebraska, Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805
(D. Neb. 2004), and the Southern District of New York, Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp.
2d at 436, antiabortion advocates believed their best chance of prevailing was with Judge
Casey in the Southern District of New York. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n, 320 F. Supp.
2d at 957; 'Partial-Birth Abortion' Law Rejected by Judge, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2004, at
A4 (observing that among the three judges hearing the issue, Judge Casey "was
considered by some observers to be the best legal hope for the law's supporters"); Cynthia
L. Cooper, Women-Health: 'Fetal Pain' Bill New Item on Anti-Choice Agenda, INTER
PRESS SERVICF, Aug. 19, 2004, 2004 WL 59285031 (noting that Judge Casey is "embraced
as [an] all[y] by the anti-choice Web sites, where [his] comments are widely quoted").
7. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 493.
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1273
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:1273
the Act is unconstitutional."9 Two other federal courts that decided the
same question reached the same conclusion: The 2003 Ban is
unconstitutional. 10
These three decisions highlight the dilemma antiabortion" advocates
face. Before the Supreme Court decided Roe in 1973,2 many states had
enforced long-standing abortion laws. 3  State legislatures handled
abortion as a state-law issue through principles of representative
democracy. 4 However, in Roe, the Supreme Court declared a federal
constitutional right to abortion.15  By identifying abortion as a
fundamental right,16 Roe established a strict standard of scrutiny for
9. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 493. In striking down the 2003 Ban,
Judge Casey also confessed that "Stenberg obligates this Court and Congress to defer to
the expressed medical opinion of a significant body of medical authority." Id.
10. See Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1048; Planned Parenthood Fed'n, 320 F. Supp. 2d
at 1034-35.
11. While groups advocating for or against abortion use many names to describe
themselves and their opponents, including pro-life, pro-choice, anti-choice, pro-abortion,
and antiabortion, the author chooses "abortion rights" and "antiabortion" for the
following reasons: (1) both terms refer directly to the subject of the debate and (2) both
sides are more likely to use different labels to describe themselves. See Kerry Dougherty,
"Choose" and "Life" Add Up to Two Extremely Politically Prickly Words, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Mar. 1, 2003, at B1, 2003 WL 6155538 (recognizing that abortion
rights advocates want to be labeled pro-choice and antiabortion advocates want to be
labeled pro-life); Heather Sokoloff, Focus Groups Used for Rebranding Abortion Rights,
NAT'L POST (Ontario, Can.), Jan. 11, 2003, at B8 (describing how the abortion rights
advocacy group National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL)
recently changed its name to NARAL Pro Choice America to better market itself to
"target audiences"). The Sokoloff article cites a survey indicating that only one
newspaper permitted its reporters to refer to the respective positions as "pro-life" and
"pro-choice." See Sokoloff, supra; see also ASSOCIATED PRESS, STYLEBOOK AND
BRIEFING ON MEDIA LAW 5 (Norm Goldstein ed., 40th ed. 2005) ("Use anti-abortion
instead of pro-life and abortion rights instead of pro-abortion or pro-choice.").
12. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
13. See B.J. George, Jr., State Legislatures Versus the Supreme Court: Abortion
Legislation into the 1990s, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 3, 9-17 (J. Douglas
Butler & David F. Walbert eds., rev. 4th ed. 1992) (discussing numerous state statutes
prohibiting or regulating abortion).
14. See id. at 3 (observing that "[a]bortion regulation was a matter exclusively for
state legislatures until 1973, when the United States Supreme Court brought medically
indicated abortions within the protection of the fourteenth amendment in Roe v. Wade
and Doe v. Bolton.").
15. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. The Roe majority found the right to abortion derived
from the right to privacy "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action." Id. at 153.
16. Id. at 152-53 (declaring that "only personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty[]' . . . are included in this
guarantee of personal privacy" and finding that the right to abortion is within the right of
privacy (citation omitted) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))). But
see id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he asserted right to an abortion is not 'so
1274
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abortion legislation; when a statute infringed upon the right, the
legislature had to demonstrate a "compelling state interest" for the
statute to survive judicial review. 17 Consequently, Roe invalidated most
contemporary state laws prohibiting abortion.'
Later, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,9 the Supreme Court weakened
Roe's strict standard of scrutiny by holding that legislatures may not
place an "undue burden" on a woman seeking an abortion. 2 Despite the
weaker standard of scrutiny, courts still view abortion as a fundamental
constitutional right.2 ' As a result, abortion rights advocates continue to
challenge abortion restrictions on federal constitutional grounds,
frustrating the will of elected state and federal legislatures. 22
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
17. See id. at 155 (explaining how state regulation of fundamental rights triggers
"compelling state interest" scrutiny, which means "legislative enactments must be
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake").
18. See George, supra note 13, at 15-16, 21-23 (describing how most states, despite
anticipating the invalidation of their pre-1973 abortion legislation, were impacted by Roe).
19. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
20. See id. at 876-77.
21. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920-22 (2000) (summarizing how
fundamental individual liberty required the Court to invalidate Nebraska's partial-birth
abortion statute).
22. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(insisting that, "[wihile Congress and lower courts may disagree with the Supreme Court's
constitutional decisions, that does not free them from their constitutional duty to obey the
Supreme Court's rulings"); see also Bernard Harris, Pitts Cheers Major Abortion 'Victory',
LANCASTER NEW ERA (Pennsylvania), June 5, 2003, 2003 WL 4813329 (noting that about
thirty states had partial-birth abortion bans, and "abortion-rights groups said they had
been successful in court challenges in about 20 states"). In 2003, the Center for
Reproductive Rights litigated thirty-five abortion cases, covering such issues as "[f]unding
for [a]bortion," "[b]ans on [a]bortion," and "[mledical [albortion [r]estrictions." See
CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 6, available at
http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/annual_2003.pdf. The Center for Reproductive
Rights' 2003 Annual Report included a letter from the Center's president, Nancy
Northrup. Id. at 3. In addressing her constituents, Ms. Northrup summarized
developments in abortion law in 2003:
This is a difficult time for the reproductive rights movement. With a federal
government and state legislatures pushing harder than ever to restrict women's
reproductive health care choices both in the United States and abroad, the
Center aggressively challenged laws and policies to limit women's reproductive
freedom. Despite our opponents' unrelenting efforts to roll back the gains we
fought so hard to attain, we have reason to celebrate.
... Our opponents label us 'undemocratic' for securing judicial protection of
constitutional and human rights. Court-bashing misunderstands the critical role
of human rights and the judiciary in free and fair democracies. It is not majority
rule that defines a healthy democracy-majority rule can be wielded for good or
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:1273
Consequently, thirty-one years after Roe, antiabortion advocates struggle
21
to change social policy in the abortion arena. Yet, they fail to achieve
significant reforms because federal courts strike down legislation
restricting abortion on constitutional grounds.
In this new century, antiabortion advocates must consider a new
25approach to counteract the constitutional protection of abortion.Antiabortion advocates should adopt the strategy used by antitobacco
ill. We will continue to fight for the full realization of the commitment of human
rights in law and in the hearts and minds of the public.
Id. Implicit in Ms. Northrup's statement is the assumption that the Center for
Reproductive Rights does, when necessary, oppose "majority rule" to win "human rights
in law," including abortion rights. Id.
In contrast, Norma McCorvey, the woman known as Jane Roe in Roe, recently brought
a motion in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to
reconsider and overturn the Roe decision. See McCorvey v. Hill, No. Civ. A.
303CV1340N, 2003 WL 21448388, at *1, *3 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2003) (denying Rule 60(b)
Motion for Relief from Judgment). The district court denied McCorvey's motion, and the
Fifth Circuit dismissed her appeal. McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 2004) (3-0
decision), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 1387 (2005). Although Judge Edith Jones concurred in
the outcome, she expressed frustration with current abortion law:
[B]ecause the Court's rulings have rendered basic abortion policy beyond the
power of our legislative bodies, the arms of representative government may not
meaningfully debate McCorvey's evidcnce. The perverse result of the Court's
having determined through constitutional adjudication this fundamental social
policy, which affects over a million women and unborn babies each year, is that
the facts no longer matter. This is a peculiar outcome for a Court so committed
to "life" that it struggles with the particular facts of dozens of death penalty cases
each year.
Id. at 852 (Jones, J., concurring). Judge Jones' concurrence "gave anti-abortion advocates
a glimmer of hope." Joe Gyan, Jr., Judge's Remarks Offer Abortion Foes Hope,
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 24,2004, at liB.
23. See, e.g., Gyan, supra note 22 (describing how Norma McCorvey, the plaintiff in
Roe, brought a lawsuit to overturn Roe, an attempt that was rejected by a Fifth Circuit
panel).
24. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
25. The antiabortion movement already recognizes this strategy of circumventing
constitutional barriers: "Since the legal and political opposition to abortion [during the
1970s and 1980s] failed to yield the results that abortion foes expected, abortion opponents
switched from trying to make abortion illegal to trying to make it impossible." Heather A.
Smith, A New Prescription for Abortion, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1073-76 (2002); see
also A.J. Stone, Consti-Tortion: Tort Law As an End-Run Around Abortion Rights After
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 471, 472-74 (2000)
(describing attempts by legislators and antiabortion advocates to circumvent the
constitutional right to an abortion by "us[ing] ...tort law to restrict abortion rights");
Jennifer L. Achilles, Comment, Using Tort Law To Circumvent Roe v. Wade and Other
Pesky Due Process Decisions: An Examination of Louisiana's Act 825, 78 TUL. L. REV.
853, 854-59, 880-82 (2004) (discussing the Louisiana state legislature's Act 825, which
imposes tort liability on abortion providers, impeding the availability of abortion services
and, thereby, the right to an abortion).
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advocates during the 1990s:16 mass tort class action litigation. 27  This
Comment proposes that the antiabortion movement pursue mass tort
class action litigation against abortion providers (Big Abortion) to
reform social policy.2 8
This Comment begins by surveying the historical and legal framework
for the three waves of Big Tobacco litigation. It then outlines how the
constitutional right to an abortion developed. After outlining the
Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence, the Comment examines the
potential psychological and physical harms that face women who have
abortions. Next, this Comment evaluates recent attempts to use
litigation and legislation to restrict Big Abortion. After establishing the
foundation of Big Tobacco and Big Abortion, this Comment analyzes
Big Abortion from the perspectives of (1) the people involved; (2) the
legal principles at issue; and (3) the strategic conditions necessary for
success. Finally, the Comment concludes by articulating why
antiabortion advocates should pursue Big Abortion litigation.
I. NON-REPRESENTATIVE SOCIAL POLICY REFORM IN THE TOBACCO
AND ABORTION INDUSTRIES
A. Big Tobacco: A Study in Social Policy Reform Through Mass Tort
Class Action Litigation
Big Tobacco litigation is a paradigm for reforming social policy
through class action litigation. 9 It encompasses hundreds of lawsuits,
26. This Comment can be compared to Graham E. Kelder and Richard A. Daynard's
Tobacco Litigation As a Public Health and Cancer Control Strategy, 51 J. AM. MED.
WOMEN'S ASS'N 57 (1996), which proposed litigation against the tobacco industry to
reform social policy and analyzed the practical aspects of executing such litigation, id. at
57-62.
27. See discussion infra Part I.A.3.
28. See Justin Torres, Abortion Industry: The Next Target of Tobacco-Like Lawsuits?,
CNSNEWS.coM, Aug. 9, 2000, at http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation.aspPage=fNation/
archivefNAT2000009d.html (suggesting that "[a] lawsuit against an abortion clinic in
Fargo, North Dakota, might be an opening for a series of class action suits against the
abortion industry for failing to disclose the dangers of the procedure"). The term "social
policy reform," as used here, will mean: (1) changing public perception towards a social
issue; (2) changing governmental treatment of the issue; and (3) changing industry
dynamics.
29. See Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation As Public Health Policy:
Theory or Reality?, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHics 224, 230 tbl.1 (2002) (listing, as of August 1,
2001, fifteen hundred individual lawsuits, twenty-eight class actions, and fifty-two health-
care cost recovery lawsuits against tobacco company Philip Morris); see also Howard M.
Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of
Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) ("The
tobacco litigation is the most massive in a string of mass torts including asbestos, Dalkon
20051 1277
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:1273
multiple billion-dollar settlements and jury verdicts," and numerous
written commentaries.2 This Comment now examines the development
of Big Tobacco litigation.
1. The Impending Tobacco Health Crisis and the Corresponding Lack
of Social Policy Reform
The story of Big Tobacco litigation begins on January 11, 1964, when
United States Surgeon General Luther L. Terry released the Surgeon
General's Report on Smoking and Health (Report).33 The Report stated,
in revolutionary terms, that "[c]igarette smoking is causally related to
lung cancer in men; the magnitude of the effect of cigarette smoking far
outweighs all other factors. The data for women, though less extensive,
point in the same direction. '' 34  The Committee issuing the Report
concluded that "[c]igarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient
importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial
action." 5 From January 11, 1964 onward, America was on notice of the
serious health risks of smoking.36
Despite the Report's revelations about the dangers of smoking, neither
the United States government, 37 nor the American public, 38 nor the
Shield, and breast implants; it is arguably the most important public health matter ever
litigated.").
30. See Jacobson & Soliman, supra note 29, at 227-31 (calculating the number of Big
Tobacco lawsuits).
31. See id. at 231 (describing individual plaintiff verdicts and the state and federal
government settlements).
32. See, e.g., DONLEY T. STUDLAR, TOBACCO CONTROL 176 tbl.5-1 (2002) (listing
thirty-three books about tobacco politics); James Cahoy, Tobacco Liability Pathfinder,
WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, June 11, 1996, at 1996 WL 311656 (providing a list of published
legal and news articles about Big Tobacco).
33. See OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HISTORY OF THE 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON SMOKING AND HEALTH,
available at http://www.cdc.govltobacco/30yrsgen.htm (last reviewed Jan. 26, 2005).
34. PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. No.
1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE
SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 37 (1964), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr_1964/sgr64.htm.
35. Id. at 33.
36. Arguably, by the Report's release, Americans were already on constructive notice
of the link between smoking and cancer. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the
Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 856-57 (1992). In 1952, Reader's Digest
published an article that forecast smoking-related deaths could reach catastrophic
numbers. Id. at 856.
37. Milo Geyelin & Gordon Fairclough, Taking a Hit.- Yes, $145 Billion Deals
Tobacco a Huge Blow, but Not a Killing One, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2000, at Al ("The
surgeon general's famous 1964 antismoking report led not to a government crackdown but
to health-warning labels, which the industry has used effectively as a shield against many
smokers' claims of ignorance about health risks.").
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tobacco companies 9 responded effectively to this health disaster of
epidemic proportions. 0  Congress failed to enact strong smoking
restrictions, choosing instead to require generic warnings on cigarette
packages and advertisements.4 ' The American public continued to
consume cigarettes at a pace comparable to the pre-Report era, with only
42
a gradual reduction in consumption over decades. Finally, because they
faced little real regulatory or consumer pressure, the major tobacco
companies continued their wholesale promotion of cigarettes 3
Moreover, the tobacco companies established two non-profit entities, the
Council for Tobacco Research-USA, Inc. and the Tobacco Institute,
which they presented as objective research centers." In reality, the
tobacco companies used these organizations to misinform the public of
the health risks of smoking.4 The general apathy of the government, the
public, and the tobacco industry had created a void where social policy
reform was desperately needed.
2. The Three Waves of Big Tobacco Litigation
The answer to the lack of democratic social policy reform in the
tobacco industry arrived in three waves of litigation.46 Even before the
Report, this litigation began with individual plaintiffs bringing tort suits
38. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
39. See FRANK V. TURSI ET AL., LOST EMPIRE 99, 102-05 (Ken Otterbourg ed. 2000)
(detailing how the tobacco industry responded to the Report by (1) creating a Committee
of Counsel composed of six lawyers whose only task was "to keep the tobacco companies
out of court"; (2) hiring a public relations firm to maintain "doubt about the causes of
cancer"; (3) controlling tobacco research to be consistent with the industry's positions; and
(4) donating to members of both major political parties to influence politics).
40. See Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the
Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV., Winter 1997, at
63. 66-70 (1997) (describing how the tobacco industry influenced lawmakers to protect the
tobacco industry).
41. See STUDLAR, supra note 32, at 36 (describing the diluted warning requirements
passed by Congress during the 1960s).
42. See OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 33 fig.2.1, 42 (2000),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr 2000/FullReport.pdf.
43. See TURSI ET AL., supra note 39, at 96-97.
44. OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, supra note 42, at 230, 237.
45. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 40, at 79-80 (detailing how tobacco companies
used the Council for Tobacco Research to screen research it claimed was unbiased); Press
Release, The State Tobacco Information Center, Vacco Files Suit Against Tobacco
Industry: Slaps Companies for Targeting Youth (Jan. 27, 1997), available at
http://stic.neu.edu/NylVaccoPrl.html (asserting that the Tobacco Institute and Council for
Tobacco Research were established to misinform the public).
46. See Peter D. Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public Health Policy
Making: The Case of Tobacco Control, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 769, 775-77 (1999);
Kelder & Daynard, supra note 40, at 70.
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against the tobacco companies, and, eventually, it evolved to include
class action litigation and statutory litigation by state and federal
attorneys general.4 ' Therefore, while the government, the public, and the
tobacco industry expressed unwillingness to reform social policy,
smokers led the way with non-representative litigation.
Although plaintiffs in the first two waves of tobacco litigation put the
tobacco companies on the defensive, they were unsuccessful in obtaining
favorable outcomes. 8 In the first wave, from 1954 to 1973, the tobacco
companies consistently out-spent and out-strategized individual plaintiffs
and their lawyers. 49 During the second wave, from 1983 to 1992, plaintiffs
brought product liability claims, but courts rejected both design and
manufacturing defect theories of liability.50 At the end of the second
wave came Cipollone v. Ligett Group, Inc.51 While the Cipollone plaintiff
was unsuccessful in recovering damages, the Supreme Court's decision in
that 1992 case offered plaintiffs hope.52 The Cipollone Court held that
mandatory federal warnings on cigarette packages and advertisements
did not preempt state law causes of action based on express warranty,
conspiracy, and fraud, thereby allowing future plaintiffs to sue under
state law. 3
In the third wave of tobacco litigation, the balance shifted away from
the tobacco companies as a result of the filing of the Castano v. American
Tobacco Co.54 class action in 1994.15 According to one commentator,
Castano represents the end of the defendant advantage in tobacco
litigation, an advantage that led both courts and juries over the previous
thirty years to reject smokers' claims.56 In Castano, a group of law firms,
47. See Ed Dawson, Note, Legigation, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1727, 1729-31 (2001).
48. See Rabin, supra note 36, at 857-59.
49. Id. at 859; see also Jacobson & Warner, supra note 46, at 775 ("During the first
wave of litigation (1954-1973), the industry successfully defended negligence charges by
arguing that smokers assumed the risk and should not be able to recover.").
50. Jacobson & Warner, supra note 46, at 775-76.
51. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
52. Id. at 519-20; see also Dawson, supra note 47, at 1730.
53. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-31 (plurality opinion); see also Kelder & Daynard,
supra note 40, at 72 (noting that the Third Circuit overturned the $400,000 verdict in
Cipollone before the Supreme Court interpreted the preemptive effect of the federal
tobacco advertising statutes).
54. 870 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. La. 1994).
55. Id. at 1430. Despite the pressure building toward the third wave of Big Tobacco
litigation, CEOs from seven tobacco companies "testified [on April 14, 1994, before a
congressional subcommittee] under oath that they believed nicotine is not addictive and
that smoking has not been shown to cause cancer." Kelder & Daynard, supra note 40, at
76.
56. Howard M. Erichson, The End of the Defendant Advantage in Tobacco Litigation,
26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 123, 123 (2001) (declaring that "[t]he tobacco
1280 [Vol. 54:1273
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eventually numbering over sixty, each contributed $100,000 to fund the
national class action lawsuit against the major tobacco companies."
Initially, the federal trial court certified the class. 5' However, upon
reviewing the certification, the Fifth Circuit characterized the Castano
class central allegation as a "novel and wholly untested theory that the
defendants fraudulently failed to inform consumers that nicotine is
addictive and manipulated the level of nicotine in cigarettes to sustain
their addictive nature., 59 This theory produced "nine causes of action:
fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligence and negligent infliction of emotional
distress, violation of state consumer protection statutes, breach of
express warranty, breach of implied warranty, strict product liability, and
redhibition pursuant to the Louisiana Civil Code." 6
Although the Fifth Circuit decertified the class, Castano signaled four
strategic developments in tobacco litigation that ended the tobacco
companies' advantage: 61 (1) the capitalization of the plaintiff's bar; (2)
litigation has established, above all, that the systematic defendant advantage in mass tort
litigation is dead").
57. See id. at 131.
58. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 560-61 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd,
84 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 1996). The judge ruled that the plaintiffs satisfied Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a)'s prerequisites for certification and then certified the class under
Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at 550-51; see also Susan E. Kearns, Note, Decertification of Statewide
Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1336, 1359 (1999) (naming the prerequisites for
a class action lawsuit: "numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation"). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) reads:
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or tact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) requires that
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
59. Castano, 84 F.3d at 737.
60. Id. Redhibition is a civil code action for rescission of the sale of a defective or
faulty product. See 77A C.J.S. Sales § 128 (1994).
61. Erichson, supra note 56, at 138, 141.
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the coordination of the plaintiff's bar; (3) the participation of
government in litigation against the defendants; and (4) the ingenuity of
the plaintiff's bar in pursuing class actions, flaunting appellate reluctance
62to certify such classes. As the third wave of tobacco litigation evolved,
63the four developments led to new class action lawsuits in state courts.
Lawyers chose to bring class actions in state courts to avoid pitfalls they
faced earlier, such as federal appellate antagonism to class certification
and difficulties maintaining a nationwide class.64
In 2000, the jury in Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco6 awarded a class of
700,000 Florida smokers approximately $12 million in compensatory
damages and $145 billion in punitive damages.66 Another Florida class
action, Broin v. Philip Morris Cos.," brought by flight attendants exposed
681to second-hand cigarette smoke, settled for $300 million to establish a
research and detection center for tobacco diseases and $49 million in
attorneys' fees and costs.
69
During the third wave, state attorneys general, inspired by the
revelation that the tobacco companies concealed knowledge that
cigarette smoking is addictive and has harmful health effects, filed suits
to recover Medicaid expenditures for treatment of tobacco-related
70
illnesses. In a settlement with Minnesota, Big Tobacco agreed to a
broad range of restrictions, including the dissolution of the Council for
Tobacco Research, numerous restrictions on advertising, with a specific
reference to not advertising to minors, and an agreement to cease
62. Id. at 123. Professor Howard Erichson suggests mass tort litigation will someday
be described as "pre-tobacco and post-tobacco" because the four developments in the
plaintiff's bar leveled the playing field between "David" (plaintiffs) and "Goliath"
(corporate defendants). Id. at 141.
63. See id. at 136-39.
64. See id. at 138-39 (suggesting that "it appears that mass tort class actions have met
with greater success in state court than in federal court"); Kelder & Daynard, supra note
40, at 85-86 (asserting that statewide class actions are preferable to nationwide class
actions because statewide class actions are more manageable and do not pose choice of
law concerns).
65. No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 WL 33534572 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000), rev'd sub
nom. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), review
granted, 873 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2004).
66. Id. at *31-*32; see also Engle, 853 So. 2d at 440, 442. A Florida district court of
appeals reversed the jury verdict. Id. at 470. The decision is currently pending before the
Florida Supreme Court. See Engle, 873 So. 2d at 1222.
67. 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
68. Id. at 889.
69. See Bob Van Voris, Secondhand Smoke Deal Draws Fire, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 27,
1997, at A7.
70. Dawson, supra note 47, at 1731.
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misrepresenting the health consequences of smoking.' Further pressure
from the states forced Big Tobacco to the negotiating table where, in
1998, forty-six states approved a $206 billion Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA).72 The MSA included concessions by Big Tobacco to
limit its advertising, to disclose industry research, and to support
programs to deter smoking, help smokers quit, and prevent tobacco-
related diseases.73
3. The State of Non-Representative Social Policy Reform in the
Tobacco Industry
Commentators debate how successful litigation is in reforming social
policy.7 4 In the short term, some reforms attributed to the third wave of
tobacco litigation include: (1) elimination of the tobacco companies'• • • 75
"independent" advocacy and research institutions; (2) increases in
cigarette prices, leading to a measurable decrease in consumption;76 and
(3) government involvement in prosecuting claims against Big Tobacco.77
B. Big Abortion: A Consideration of Opportunities for Social Policy
Reform
The constitutional right to an abortion in the United States was first
recognized more than thirty years ago with Roe v. Wade.8 Since then,
state and federal legislatures have continued to challenge the
constitutional limits imposed by Roe.79  Nevertheless, the core
constitutional doctrine protecting the right to an abortion remains
71. OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, supra note 42, at 239-40.
72. See Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic,
and Political Legacy of the Governments' Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143,1171
(2001).
73. OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, supra note 42, at 193-94.
74. See, e.g., Jacobson & Soliman, supra note 29, at 224 ("The litigation has achieved
some of its avowed public health policy goals, but there has been no major breakthrough
indicating litigation's viability or likely dominance as a long-term policy strategy. For a
variety of reasons, this conclusion is at best tentative and is certainly debatable.").
75. See OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, supra note 42 at 193,239.
76. See Geyelin & Fairclough, supra note 37 (attributing a seven percent decrease in
cigarette consumption during 1999 to the states' Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)
and other settlements).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
78. 410 U.S. 113,153 (1973).
79. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920-21 (2000); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d,436, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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intact.8° More recently, just as plaintiffs reformed social policy by suing
Big Tobacco, several plaintiffs have sued Big Abortion to reform social
policy.
81
1. Abortion's Origins in Constitutional Law and Its Future in Courts
and Legislatures
The Supreme Court announced the federal constitutional right to an
82abortion in Roe. The Roe majority established a trimester test which
prohibited the state from interfering with a woman's decision to obtain
an abortion during the first trimester of her pregnancy. 3 Furthermore,
the state could not restrict abortion if the woman's "life or health," as
defined by Doe v. Bolton,s4 was threatened."' The Court's decisions in
80. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46 (affirming Roe's "essential holding"); see also
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 920-21 (noting serious disagreement in public opinion but citing
"established principles" to uphold "the right to an abortion").
81. See infra text accompanying notes 133-50.
82. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Justice Blackmun, writing for Roe's seven-justice majority,
identified the constitutional right to an abortion:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or,
as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights
to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy.
Id. The day the Court decided Roe, it also decided Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
Justice Blackmun noted that Roe and Doe should be interpreted as integral constitutional
doctrine. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165. Doe invalidated procedural restrictions Georgia imposed
on women who wanted to obtain abortions under a health exception to the state law
proscribing abortion. Doe, 410 U.S. at 181-84, 194, 198-200 (invalidating requirements of
accreditation, board review, second medical opinions, and residency). Additionally, the
Doe majority broadly interpreted the health exception to include evaluation of factors
relevant to the woman's well-being including her physical, emotional, psychological, and
familial status, as well as her age. Id. at 191-92.
83. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. The trimester test divided the woman's pregnancy into
three phases: during the first trimester, the state was barred from interfering with the
decision of the woman and her physician whether to abort her fetus; during the second
phase, which ran from the end of the first trimester until viability, the State could regulate
abortion procedures by regulations that were "reasonably related to" the woman's health;
during the third phase, post-viability, the State could "regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother." Id. at 164-65.
84. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
85. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64; Doe, 410 U.S. at 192. Although the Roe health exception
could have been interpreted narrowly, the Court defined it in Doe to include an
assessment of "all factors - physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's
age," allowing a wide range of justifications for abortion during any stage of pregnancy.
Id. at 192.
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Roe and other abortion cases invalidated most state statutes restricting
abortion.86
Later, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,"' the Court refused the
opportunity to overturn Roe."' Instead, the Court eliminated the
trimester test and replaced it with the undue burden test.89 The undue
burden test allows a state to regulate abortion at any point during
pregnancy as long as the regulation does not impose an undue burden
upon the woman. 90 However, the Casey Court left the Roe health
exception intact, allowing women to obtain abortions at any point during
their pregnancies if their medical conditions satisfy Doe's broad
definition of "health." 91
As a result of Supreme Court precedent, lower courts continue to
impose constitutional limitations upon a state's ability to restrict
abortion. 9 Although a change in the Supreme Court's configuration
might give states more discretion to restrict abortion, it is unlikely that
86. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 176 n.2 (listing states with abortion statutes first enacted
on or before 1868 and in effect in 1970); see also George, supra note 13, at 15-17, 22
(discussing state statutes proscribing abortion and regulating abortion providers and
concluding that only three jurisdictions had no restrictions on abortion and were thus not
impacted by the Court's decisions in Roe and Doe; consequently, "[m]ost [state]
legislatures . . . revamped their statutes in response to or anticipation of judicial
invalidation of pre-1973 legislation").
87. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
8& Id. at 873-74 (holding that Roe should not be overruled, despite Chief Justice
Rehnquist's willingness to do so).
89. Id. at 843-46. An undue burden is "a state regulation [that] has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus." id. at 877.
90. Id. at 878. Casey modified the doctrinal limits of Roe by (1) establishing an undue
burden test for state regulation of abortion during the pre-viability phase and (2) allowing
states to freely regulate or proscribe abortion during the post-viability phase. Id. at 878-
79.
Despite this new doctrinal structure, Casey affirmed the constitutional right to an
abortion and the health exception first enunciated in Roe. See id. at 846, 878-79.
Additionally, the Casey Court continued to follow the precedent Roe established by
striking down some legislative restrictions on abortion. Id. at 844, 901 (invalidating
spousal notification and reporting requirements of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act
of 1982 while leaving the rest of the statute intact).
91. Id. at 879 (holding that state can proscribe abortion post-viability unless the
health exception applies); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, 164-65 (establishing the health
exception and citing to Doe as an integral part of the doctrinal picture).
92. See Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1048 (D. Neb. 2004) (finding
Congress's 2003 Ban unconstitutional because it does not have a health exception); Nat'l
Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 492-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (same); Planned
Parenthood Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1034-35 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (same).
On September 28, 2004, the Department of Justice announced plans to appeal the
Nebraska decision to the Eighth Circuit; that appeal may eventually reach the Supreme
Court. See Dan Eggen, Washington in Brief, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2004, at A6.
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this constitutional framework will disappear within the foreseeable
future. 9 Additionally, even if a new conservative majority overturned
Roe and Casey, finding the right to abortion did not exist, abortion would
again become a state issue, and states could continue to allow abortion.
94
2. Health Concerns Related to Abortion
Although the federal courts and abortion advocates consider
protecting the pregnant woman's health to be a legal justification for
abortion, 95 studies have shown abortion may actually harm women's
93. See David G. Savage, As Roe vs. Wade Turns 30, Ruling's Future is Unsure, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at Al; David Von Drehle, O'Connor Used Vote To Entrench Right to
Abortion, WASH. POST, July 2, 2005, at A10. With Justice Sandra Day O'Connor on the
bench, a majority of the Supreme Court recognized the constitutional right to an abortion.
See Savage, supra (counting the votes for and against abortion on the Supreme Court as 6-
3 or 5-4 in favor of abortion). Advocates for both sides speculate on how President
George W. Bush's reelection in 2004 will impact the Court. Id. Some commentators
suggest a new conservative majority could overturn Roe. Id. Others believe it is unlikely
Roe will be overturned. Id. Justice O'Connor's retirement continues to generate
speculation because of her central role in the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence,
particularly her opinion in Casey and her vote in Stenberg. See Von Drehle, supra.
Abortion is expected to be a central issue during the confirmation process for President
Bush's nominee to replace Justice O'Connor. Id. Although a change in the Supreme
Court's makeup may give states more discretion to restrict abortion, it is unlikely to lead
to complete reversal of the right to abortion. See id. (quoting a conservative appellate
judge who is a potential Supreme Court nominee as saying that the right to abortion is "as
settled as any issue can be in constitutional law").
94. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 591-92 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(explaining that overruling Roe would not make abortion unlawful, but would allow the
states to prohibit, restrict, or allow abortion on a state-by-state basis). As Justice Scalia
has written, women would still be able to get abortions if Roe was overruled, either in their
own states or in one of the numerous states that "would unquestionably have declined to
prohibit abortion [or] would not have prohibited it within six months (after which the most
significant reliance interests would have expired)." Id. at 591-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (affirming "the principle that the State has legitimate
interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman"); Roe,
410 U.S. at 149-51, 153 (recognizing that early American abortion laws originally may have
been enacted to protect women from a dangerous medical procedure, while emphasizing
the "[s]pecific and direct harm medically diagnosable" that could affect a pregnant woman
if the state was allowed to ban abortion in 1973); see also Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F.
Supp. 2d at 452-53 (discussing how the health exception is the principle behind the
Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg).
Abortion advocates also consider the health of the pregnant woman to be a legal
justification for the right to abortion. See PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED. OF AM., INC.,
NINE REASONS WHY ABORTIONS ARE LEGAL, at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/
pp2/portal/files/portal/medicalinfo/abortion/pub-abortion-legal.xml (last updated Nov.
2004) (listing the first two reasons why abortions are legal as "1. Laws against abortion kill
women" and "2. Legal abortions protect women's health"); see also Press Release,
National Organization for Women, Federal Abortion Ban Declared Unconstitutional in
Nebraska; Conservatives' Latest Attempt To Politicize Women's Health Fails (Sept. 8,
2004), http://www.now.org/press/09-04/09-08.html (referring to the Carhart decision,
1286
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health. 6 In 1987, President Ronald Reagan asked Surgeon General C.
Everett Koop to investigate and "to prepare a comprehensive report on
the health effects of abortion on women." 97 In 1989, Koop noted in a
letter responding to President Reagan that "considerable attention is
being paid to possible mental health effects of abortion" and that
researchers had conducted studies about the physical effects of
abortion.98 However, Koop concluded that "the scientific studies do not
provide conclusive data about the health effects of abortion on
women." 99 He therefore "recommend[ed] that consideration be given to
going forward with an appropriate prospective study."' ' That study was
never completed,"" and the studies available today remain inadequate to
evaluate the full health consequences of abortion on women.102
National Organization for Women President Kim Gandy said, "'Judge Kopf's poignant
decision reminds us that preserving women's health is the most important factor in this
case-not an extremist and insular right-wing agenda"').
96. See infra notes 106-32 and accompanying text. But see NARAL, SCIENCE AND
WOMEN'S HEALTH, at http://www.naral.org/Issues/science/index.cfm (last visited June 26,
2004). NARAL asserts that:
In addition to blocking scientific advancement, anti-choice groups often turn
science on its head in their effort to portray legal abortion as unsafe for
American women. In reality, legal abortion is one of the safest and most
common medical procedures available today. Legal abortion entails half the risk
of death involved in a tonsillectomy and one-hundredth the risk of death
involved in an appendectomy.... And although anti-choice groups often try to
link abortion with the risk of developing breast cancer, the largest and most
comprehensive study on the subject concluded that "induced abortions have no
overall effect on the risk of breast cancer."
Id.
97. Letter from C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General of the United States Public
Health Service, to Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, (Jan. 9, 1989)
[hereinafter Koop Letter], in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW, supra note 13, at
731.
98. Id. at 733-34.
99. Id. at 734.
100. Id. Surgeon General Koop described the general details that such a
comprehensive study should entail and concluded that the best study would cost $100
million and the minimum study would cost $10 million. Id.; cf ELIZABETH RING-
CASSIDY & IAN GENTLES, WOMEN'S HEALTH AFTER ABORTION, 6-9 (2d ed. 2003)
(describing "[limitations in the [a]vailable [1]iterature" that studies "the physical after-
effects of abortion on women").
101. Lauren Schulz, Abortion, Death Rate Linked in Study, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2002, at A4 (recalling how Koop's proposal for "a sweeping government study" of
abortion's health effects "died in Congress").
102. See RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 100, at 5 (noting that "[t]he lifelong
risks of repeat, induced, and late-term abortions on women's health are not being
addressed in the [medical] research literature, and further studies need to be done on the
long-term effects of abortion"). Another commentator explains:
Most of the medical literature published since the legalization of induced
abortion has focused on short-term surgical complications, improvement of
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:1273
However, the limited research available points to three serious health
concerns for women obtaining abortions: (1) severe psychological
problems; 03 (2) increased risk of breast cancer;1°4 and (3) side effects
from the abortifacient drug RU-486105
The first health concern is the severe psychological problems that may
result from having an abortion.'06 Several studies show that women who
have had abortions exhibit higher rates of psychiatric admission,'
07
suicide,la depression,'0 emotional distress, "0 and generalized anxiety."'
surgical techniques and training of abortion providers. The two commissioned
studies that attempted to summarize the long-term consequences of induced
abortion concluded only that future work should be undertaken to research such
effects.
Elizabeth M. Shadigian, Reviewing the Evidence, Breaking the Silence: Long-Term
Physical and Psychological Health Consequences of Induced Abortion, in THE COST OF
CHOICE 63, 63 (Erika Bachiochi ed., 2004). Two of the reasons such long-term studies are
not more numerous are (1) medical issues surrounding abortion are highly politicized on
both sides of the debate and (2) abortion is an elective procedure, so researchers face
challenges in designing methodologically sound studies). Id. at 63-64.
103. See infra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
106. See Koop Letter, supra note 97, at 733 (noting, in 1989, that "considerable
attention is being paid to possible mental health effects of abortion, For example, there
are almost 250 studies reported in the scientific literature which deal with the
psychological aspects of abortion"). Koop concluded the "data" was insufficient to
support a finding. Id.
The question on which research in this area often focuses is whether normal childbirth
or abortion causes greater psychological problems. See David C. Reardon et al.,
Psychiatric Admissions of Low-Income Women Following Abortion and Childbirth, 168
CAN. MED. ASs'N J. 1253, 1255-56 (2003).
107. Reardon et al., supra note 106, at 1253-56 (comparing medical records from low-
income California women who gave birth to women who had abortions and finding
"psychiatric admission rates subsequent to the target pregnancy event were significantly
higher for women who had had an abortion compared with women who had delivered
during every time period examined").
108. See Mika Gissler et al., Suicides After Pregnancy in Finland, 1987-94: Register
Linkage Study, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1431, 1431-34 (1996), available at http://bmj.bmjjoumals.
com/cgi/content/ fu11/313/7070/1431 (claiming that "[t]he increased risk of suicide after an
induced abortion indicates either common risk factors for both or harmful effects of
induced abortion on mental health"). The study concluded "[o]ur data clearly show,
however, that women who have experienced an abortion have an increased risk of suicide,
which should be taken into account in the prevention of such deaths." Id. at 1434.
109. John M. Thorpe, Jr. et al., Long-Term Physical and Psychological Health
Consequences of Induced Abortion: Review of the Evidence, 58 OBSTETRICAL &
GYNECOLOGICAL SURV. 67, 74 (2003) ("Other studies tabulated that demonstrated
increased risk of depression or emotional problems after induced abortion in certain
subgroups may explain the psychopathology that culminates in deliberate self harm.").
110. See id. at 73 tbl.7 & 74 (summarizing in tabular format ten studies about women's
mental health after induced abortions).
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Research also shows that health professionals can predict some
psychological reactions to abortion using known risk factors. 112
Nevertheless, research in this field is controversial and contested.
113
Scientifically sound, long-term medical scholarship is still needed." 4
A second health concern related to abortion is the potential link
between abortion and breast cancer, often abbreviated as the "ABC
link."1 '5  One detailed scholarly analysis of the ABC link's legal
implications appeared in the Wisconsin Law Review in 1998.116 The
author concluded that although the medical evidence was insufficient to
prove the ABC link with certainty, it was sufficient to establish that
"abortion providers have a duty to inform women considering the
procedure about this significant health risk before an abortion is
performed."".7
Contrary to the aforementioned article, several studies have stated
conclusively that the ABC link does not exist."8 However, critics in the
111. Jesse R. Cougle et al., Generalized Anxiety Following Unintended Pregnancies
Resolved Through Childbirth and Abortion: A Cohort Study of the 1995 National Survey of
Family Growth, 19 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 137, 138 (2005). In an analysis of the National
Survey of Family Growth, the study found "higher rates of subsequent generalized anxiety
among aborting women, compared to women who carried an unintended pregnancy to
term." Id. at 141.
112. David C. Reardon, Abortion Decisions and the Duty To Screen: Clinical, Ethical,
and Legal Implications of Predictive Risk Factors of Post-Abortion Maladjustment, 20 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 33, 37 (2003); see also Cougle et al., supra note 111, at
142.
113. See Brenda Major, Psychological Implications of Abortion-Highly Charged and
Rife with Misleading Research, 168 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1257, 1257 (2003) ("Abortion and
its psychological implications are highly controversial, politically charged issues."). The
Canadian Medical Association Journal published an issue illustrating this controversy. See
id.; Reardon et al., supra note 106, at 1253. Compare Improving Women's Health:
Understanding Depression After Pregnancy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 25 (2004) (statement of Nada L.
Stotland, Professor of Psychiatry and Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Rush
Medical Center) (testifying that the most accurate studies of the psychological effects of
abortion on women indicate that "abortions are not a significant cause of mental illness"),
with Post-Abortion Depression Research and Care Act, H.R. 4543, 108th Cong. §§ 101(a),
201(a), 204 (2004) (allocating funds for the National Institute of Health to sponsor studies
of the psychological effects of abortion on women).
114. See RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 100, at 132.
115. See, e.g., John Kindley, Comment, The Fit Between the Elements for an Informed
Consent Cause of Action and the Scientific Evidence Linking Induced Abortion with
Increased Breast Cancer Risk, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1595, 1599.
116. Id. at 1601.
117. Id. at 1644.
118. See Valerie Beral et al., Breast Cancer and Abortion: Collaborative Reanalysis of
Data from 53 Epidemiological Studies, Including 83,000 Women with Breast Cancer from
16 Countries, 363 LANCET 1007, 1014 (2004) (finding that abortion does not increase the
risk of breast cancer); Timothy L. Lash & Aliza K. Fink, Null Association Between
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medical community have challenged these studies.1  Another
consideration is that medical science has yet to identify all causes of
breast cancer, so research in the field is ongoing and may lead to new
findings. 120  A final consideration is that a distinction has developed
between the potential ABC link caused by abortion and the "protective
effect" against breast cancer resulting from a woman carrying her first
121pregnancy to term.
The findings of medical science on the ABC link are inconclusive;
researchers continue to dispute the validity and implications of specific
studies. ' Consequently, research on the ABC link, like the research on
the connection between abortion and psychological problems, remains
highly controversial, '23 and questions surrounding the ABC link are
unlikely to disappear before further research is conducted.
14
Pregnancy Termination and Breast Cancer in a Registry-Based Study of Parous Women,
110 INT'L J. CANCER 443, 446-47 (2004) (finding no association between abortion and
breast cancer); Mads Melbye et al., Induced Abortion and the Risk of Breast Cancer, 336
NEW ENG. J. MED. 81, 83-84 (1997) (finding that women who had abortions did not have a
greater risk of developing breast cancer).
119. See Angela Lanfranchi, The Abortion-Breast Cancer Link: The Studies and the
Science, in THE COST OF CHOICE, supra note 102, at 72, 74, 81-83 (finding
"methodological flaws" in studies concluding that the ABC link does not exist); David C.
Reardon, Abortion and Breast Cancer, 363 LANCET 1910, 1910-11 (2004) (disputing an
ABC link study as using too broad a population index); cf Thorpe et al., supra note 109, at
71, 74-75 (finding that although there are problems with many of the studies purporting to
find a link between abortion and breast cancer, a full-term delivery early in life provides a
well-documented protective effect against breast cancer, and women should at least be
informed of this development in making their decision).
120. See Joyce Howard Price, Breast Cancer Study Will Analyze Sisters, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2004, at A9 (reporting on a ten-year, $150 million study being conducted by the
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences on fifty thousand sisters to
determine, among other things, whether environmental factors contribute to the causes of
breast cancer).
121. AM. Ass'N OF PRO LIFE OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, INDUCED
ABORTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT RISK OF BREAST CANCER (2002), at
http://www.aaplog.org/ABC.htm; see also Thorpe et al., supra note 109, at 75-76 (arguing
that the protective effect of having a full-term delivery rather than an abortion early in life
on future breast cancer development is "undisputed," and therefore, women should be
informed that having an abortion will destroy this protection and should also be informed
that having an abortion is an "independent risk factor" for breast cancer).
122. See, e.g., RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 100, at 21-26.
123. See, e.g., Carcinogenesis; Experts Dispute Link Between Abortion and Breast
Cancer, WOMEN'S HEALTH WKLY., Jan. 1, 2004, 2004 WL 55163781 (describing the
political furor over a statement posted on Minnesota's Health Department website which
suggested an ABC link may exist).
124. See Thorpe et al., supra note 109, at 75 (concluding that further research into the
ABC link should be completed, but that young women considering an abortion should be
informed of the loss of the protective effect against breast cancer if they have abortions).
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A third health concern related to abortion is that the frequently used
abortifacient drug RU-486
1 2
1 could have serious physical side effects.
1 26
The FDA officially approved RU-486 in a highly politicized process1 on
September 28, 2000.128 Since then, no long-term study has been done on
the health effects of using RU-486.'29 However, the drug has been linked
to several deaths, ' 30 and some evidence suggests that RU-486 may cause
Regardless of whether further research is conducted, the ABC link may be developing
into a component of legal claims against abortion providers. See, e.g., Coalition on
Abortion/Breast Cancer Applauds Australian Settlement, TENNESSEE RIGHT TO
LIFE.ORG., Dec. 31, 2001, at http://tennesseerighttolife.org/news-center/archives/1231
2001-02.htm. For example, in December 2001, an Australian woman received what
allegedly was the first settlement in an informed consent case that included a claim she
should have been informed about the ABC link. Id. But see Joyce Arthur, Abortion and
Breast Cancer: A Forged Link, HUMANIST, Mar./Apr. 2002, at 7, 9 (2002) (insisting the
Australian case settled for reasons other than the ABC link). In what may be the first
American settlement to include a claim based on the loss of the protective effect of giving
birth at a young age on the risk of future development of breast cancer, a young woman
settled her lawsuit against the clinic where she had an abortion. See Press Release,
Women's Injury Network, Inc., Abortion Doctor Settles Malpractice Suit (Oct. 20, 2003),
at http://www.womensinjurynetwork.org/prwin.htm. A portion of the confidential
settlement amount will be used to screen the young woman for breast cancer later in life.
Id.
125. RU-486's generic name is mifepristone. Jeremy Manier, Teen's Death Rekindles
Abortion Pill Battle, CHI. TRIB,, Nov. 30, 2003, at 14. RU-486 is marketed in the United
States as Mifeprex and must be administered with the drug misoprostol to be an effective
abortifacient. Sarah Lueck, Abortion Foes Face Tough Battle Against RU-486 Drug,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2001, at A28. RU-486 is also known as the "morning-after pill."
William Lowther, Bush Backs Tighter Law on Morning After Pill, DAILY MAIL (London),
Feb. 8, 2001, 2001 WL 2867976.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 129-32.
127. See, e.g., Jan Cienski, U.S. Restrictions Proposed for Abortion Pill: Controversial
RU-486, NAT'L POST (Ontario), Feb. 8, 2001, at A14 (reporting on complaints by
Republican lawmakers that the Clinton administration and the United States Food and
Drug Administration "caved in to political pressure" in approving RU-486 without proper
safety restrictions or adequate testing).
128. Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, FDA Approves Mifepristone for
the Termination of Early Pregnancy (Sept. 28, 2000), at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/
news/NEW00737.html. The drug was developed by the French pharmaceutical company
Roussel-Uclef in 1985. RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 100, at 106.
Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) states that the number of women
it provided with RU-486 more than doubled from 2001 to 2002, with almost twelve
thousand women using the drug during the first half of 2002. See Barbara Sibbald,
Popularity of "Abortion Pill" Grows in US, 168 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 211, 211 (2003).
129. RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 100, at 107.
130. See Michael Day & Susan Bisset, Revealed: Two British Women Die After Taking
Controversial New Abortion Pill, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Jan. 18, 2004, at I
(stating that seven deaths occurring in France, Britain, and the United States have been
linked to RU-486).
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cancer."' Moreover, if surgical abortions are causally linked to breast
cancer, as the ABC link suggests, then RU-486 could create an even
stronger link to breast cancer because of its potentially serious physical
side effects.3
3. Recent Attempts to Reform Social Policy Through Litigation
Within the past two years, three quasi-class action lawsuits challenging
abortion have included elements of social policy reform. In Kjolsrud v.
MKB Management Corp., 3 a plaintiff sued a reproductive health care
services provider, MKB Management Corporation, doing business as
Red River Women's Clinic (MKB), under a North Dakota false
114advertising statute. Plaintiff sued MKB "on 'behalf of herself, women
seeking abortions, and the general public.""'35  The complaint alleged
MKB misled its clients and the public by distributing brochures stating
that "'[n]one of [the] claims [regarding the ABC link] are supported by
medical research or established medical organizations. ' ,136 Plaintiff
requested injunctive relief prohibiting MKB from distributing the
brochures and requiring MKB to publish information supporting the
ABC link.' The trial "court found the information contained in MKB's
brochures was neither untrue nor misleading. The court denied
[plaintiff's] request for injunctive relief and dismissed her action.'. 3. On
appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal for lack of standing without addressing the plaintiff's
substantive claims. 39
In Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation4 a California lawsuit
similar to Kjolsrud, plaintiffs brought a claim for injunctive relief against
an abortion provider that allegedly posted misleading information on its
131. See CHRIS KAHLENBORN, BREAST CANCER 111-12 (2000); Jihan A. Youssef &
Mostafa Z. Badr, Hepatocarcinogenic Potential of the Glucocorticoid Antagonist RU486 in
B6C3F1 Mice: Effect on Apoptosis, Expression of Oncogenes and the Tumor Suppressor
Gene p53, MOLECULAR CANCER, Jan. 3, 2003, at http://www.molecular-cancer.com/
content/2/1/3; see also RU-486 Suspension and Review Act of 2003, S. 1930, 108th Cong. §
2; RU-486 Suspension and Review Act of 2003, H.R. 3453, 108th Cong. § 2.
132. See KAHLENBORN, supra note 131, at 111-12.
133. 669 N.W.2d 82 (N.D. 2003).
134. Id. at 83-84.
135. Id. at 83.
136. Id. (emphasis omitted).
137. Id. at 83-84.
138. Id. at 84.
139. Id. at 88. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that plaintiff "had not read
the brochures before filing her action" and "[h]er amended supplemental complaint does
not allege she has suffered an injury from MKB's putatively illegal action." Id.
140. 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197 (Ct. App. 2004), review denied, S123182, 2004 Cal. LEXIS
3097 (Cal. Apr. 14, 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 373 (2004).
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website suggesting a lack of evidence for the ABC link.' 41 The California
Fourth District Court of Appeal dismissed the lawsuit, finding that
plaintiffs failed to offer sufficient proof validating the ABC link or
demonstrating that the websites were commercial speech.
142
a • /., '43
In the third case, Marie v. McGreevey, named plaintiffs brought a
claim in New Jersey individually and "on behalf of all women similarly
situated.' '4 4 However, Marie is different from Kjolsrud and Bernardo
because the plaintiffs in Marie argued that New Jersey's Wrongful Death
Act (WDA), which did not authorize a cause of action for the death of a
fetus, violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1'  The plaintiffs sought recovery under the
WDA, alleging they had abortions performed in the absence of their
grant of informed consent. 1 6  They also claimed that New Jersey's
informed consent laws violated equal protection and due process by
providing "affirmative protection" to doctors performing wrongful
abortions. 14 On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected all of plaintiffs' claims,
but noted that plaintiffs' "allegations would seem to give rise to certain
state-law causes of action.'1 48 The court reasoned that "rw]omen who
believe they submitted to abortions without informed consent may be
able to sue for damages under New Jersey law."', 49 However, the Third
Circuit did not speculate further about the merits of the informed
consent causes of action."
141. Id. at 203. The three female plaintiffs sued under California's Unfair
Competition Law and False Advertising Law, claiming that the national and local websites
for Planned Parenthood violated the advertising statutes by misrepresenting the evidence
related to the ABC link. Id.
142. Id. at 228. The court ruled defendants were entitled to have the lawsuit dismissed
under California's strategic lawsuits against public participation statute (anti-SLAPP). Id.
143. 314 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 910 (2003).
144. Id. at 136. The Third Circuit noted that "[p]laintiffs also seek class certification of
individuals similarly situated to both groups of named plaintiffs. The District Court
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint without reaching this issue." Id. at 139 n.1.
145. Id. at 139.
146. Id. at 139-40. First, the plaintiffs argued "that [they and those similarly situated
had] been discriminated against in being denied the ability to recover damages in a
wrongful death action on behalf of their aborted fetuses under New Jersey law." Id. at
140. Second, the plaintiffs argued that New Jersey violated their due process and equal
protection rights because the state did not have stricter informed consent requirements
before a doctor performed an abortion. Id. at 142. Plaintiffs believed doctors should
inform women that the fetus was a "human being." Id. at 142-43.
147. Id. at 142-43.
148. Id. at 139.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 139-40.
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4. Recent Legislative Developments in Social Policy Reform
While legislation restricting or banning abortion procedures faces
substantial constitutional barriers,' a recent legislative development
may pave the way for widespread tort litigation against abortion
providers.152  A Louisiana statute creates a civil cause of action that
allows a woman to sue an abortion doctor for performing an abortion on
her, even if she signed a consent form.15 3  The statute survived
constitutional challenges in state15 4 and federal 5' appellate courts on
standing grounds. 56 With this precedent, other states may pass similar
statutes.157
151. See supra Part I.B.1.
152. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
153. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12 (West Supp. 2005); Achilles, supra note 25,
at 854-55. The statute reads:
A. Any person who performs an abortion is liable to the mother of the
unborn child for any damage occasioned or precipitated by the abortion, which
action survives for a period of three years from the date of discovery of the
damage with a peremptive period of ten years from the date of the abortion.
B. For purposes of this Section:
(1) "Abortion" means the deliberate termination of an intrauterine human
pregnancy after fertilization of a female ovum, by any person, including the
pregnant woman herself, with an intention other than to produce a live birth or
to remove a dead unborn child.
(2) "Damage" includes all special and general damages which are
recoverable in an intentional tort, negligence, survival, or wrongful death action
for injuries suffered or damages occasioned by the unborn child or mother.
(3) "Unborn child" means the unborn offspring of human beings from the
moment of conception through pregnancy and until termination of the
pregnancy.
C. (1) The signing of a consent form by the mother prior to the abortion does
not negate this cause of action, but rather reduces the recovery of damages to the
extent that the content of the consent form informed the mother of the risk of
the type of injuries or loss for which she is seeking to recover.
(2) The laws governing medical malpractice or limitations of liability thereof
provided in Title 40 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 are not applicable
to this Section.
§ 9:2800.12.
154. Women's Health Clinic v. State, 825 So. 2d 1208 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
155. Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001).
156. Id. at 409 (plurality opinion); Women's Health Clinic, 825 So. 2d at 1212-13. One
commentator concludes that "[u]nlike the unconstitutional statutes before it, however, Act
825 cannot be challenged facially because it contemplates a private cause of action. Even
more significantly, however, it is unlikely this statute will ever be challenged at all." See
Achilles, supra note 25, at 883. While conceding that a facial challenge may not be
successful, the commentator believes the statute is unconstitutional. See id. at 880.
157. See Achilles, supra note 25, at 882.
1294
2005] Big Abortion 1295
5. The State of the Abortion Industry Today
Big Abortion is big business. According to recent figures,
approximately 1.31 million abortions were performed in the United
States during the year 2000.58 The average cost of an abortion is $372, so
the abortion industry generates an estimated $487 million in annual
revenue. 5 A total of 1,819 facilities performed abortions in 2000.60
Abortion clinics and other clinics, which consist of forty-six percent of
facilities performing abortions, performed ninety-three percent of
abortions, or 1,219,910 abortions.
161
The embodiment of Big Abortion is Planned Parenthood Federation
of America, Inc. (Planned Parenthood). 62  Planned Parenthood's
affiliates performed a reported 227,375 abortion procedures in 2002, an
increase of 6.7% over the previous year. 63 Planned Parenthood's total
revenue for the fiscal year 2003 was $766.6 million,' and it has "125
158. See Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in
the United States in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 6, 9 (2003),
available at http://wvw.agi-usa.org/pubs/journals/3500603.pdf. The Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, which has no mandatory reporting requirement, calculated
857,475 "legally induced abortions" were performed in 2000. See Laurie D. Elam-Evans et
al., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Abortion Surveillance- United States, 2000,
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Nov. 28, 2003, at 1, 2, 4, 8-9. The higher figure
of 1.31 million abortions is from The Alan Guttmacher Institute, which performs its own
direct research. See id. at 9. Although a more recent figure is available, the author
chooses the year 2000 number of 1.31 million abortions because this figure is linked to
other data about abortion incidence and abortion providers.
159. See Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, The Accessibility of Abortion
Services in the United States, 2001, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 16, 19
(2003), available at http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/ournals/3501603.pdf. Multiplying 1.31
million abortions by the average cost of $372 produces a figure of $487.32 million. See id.
160. See Finer & Henshaw, supra note 158, at 12 tbl.5. The total number of abortion
providers includes 447 abortion clinics, 386 other clinics, 603 hospitals, and 383 physicians'
offices. Id.
161. See id. The remaining seven percent of abortions are performed in hospitals and
physicians' offices, which compose fifty-four percent of the total number of abortion
facilities. See id.
162. See PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED'N OF AM., 2002-2003 ANNUAL REPORT 6-7,
16-17 (Jon Knowles & Barbara Snow eds., 2003) (detailing Planned Parenthood's financial
condition and activities including (1) performing 213,026 abortions at affiliated centers in
2001; (2) forming a campaign to protect Roe by opposing "the nomination of anti-choice
judges"; (3) generating total annual revenue of $766.6 million; and (4) supporting The
Alan Guttmacher Institute, which specializes in "reproductive health research, policy
analysis, and public education").
163. See id. at 6. Planned Parenthood affiliates perform approximately eighteen
percent of all abortions in the United States. Compare id. at 6 (227,375 Planned
Parenthood abortions), with THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., INDUCED ABORTION IN
THE UNITED STATES (2005) (1.29 million total abortions in 2002), available at
http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/fb-induced-abortion.pdf.
164. See PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED'N OF AM., supra note 162, at 16 tbl.
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affiliates [who] manage 866 health centers and have a presence in all 50
states and the District of Columbia.' ' 165  Additionally, Planned
Parenthood partially supports The Alan Guttmacher Institute,166 a non-
profit research center on women's health and reproductive issues that
advocates for abortion rights.
1 67
In contrast to the detailed information about abortion providers that is
available, the identities of corporations involved in the development,
production, and distribution of RU-486 in the United States are difficult
to discover."" However, the manufacturer is a Chinese company, Hua
Lian Pharmaceutical' 6 9  and the American distributor is Danco
Laboratories.'7 Other companies may be implicated in the network of
development, manufacture, and distribution.'
II. MASS TORT CLASS ACTION LITIGATION AGAINST BIG ABORTION AS
A TOOL FOR SOCIAL POLICY REFORM
Big Tobacco is the paradigm for social policy reform through mass tort
class action litigation. Therefore, comparing and contrasting Big
Tobacco with Big Abortion provides a method for assessing whether Big
Abortion litigation can succeed. To analyze Big Tobacco and Big
Abortion, this Comment considers the people involved-the plaintiffs,
defendants, lawyers, and experts. Next, this Comment examines the law
at issue-the causes of action, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, the
class certification prerequisites, and the class certification requirements.
Finally, this Comment explores the strategic conditions necessary for
success-the state of science, the development of class action law, and
the political climate.
165. Id. at "About PPFA." Planned Parenthood is a not-for-profit organization. Id.
166. See id. at 17 ("The Alan Guttmacher Institute, a special affiliate to which Planned
Parenthood supplies some support, is an independent, not-for-profit corporation for
reproductive health research, policy analysis, and public education."). Planned
Parenthood lists its expenses for The Alan Guttmacher Institute as $8.1 million. See id. at
16 tbl.
167. See, e.g., Rachel Benson Gold, Lessons from Before Roe: Will Past Be Prologue?,
GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y, Mar. 2003, at 8, 11 (arguing, as "conclusions and
opinions" of The Alan Guttmacher Institute, that making abortion constitutional
benefited women), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/06/l/grO6OlO8.pdf.
168. See NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., RU-486: THE PILL, THE PROCESS, THE
PROBLEMS, at http://www.nrlc.org/ru486all.html (last visited June 27, 2005).
169. See Philip P. Pan, Chinese Factory Makes RU-486 for U.S. Market, DENVER POST,
Oct. 15, 2000,2000 WL 25831171 (describing how the FDA attempted to hide the identity
of RU-486's manufacturer for "safety and security" reasons).
170. See Manier, supra note 125.
171. See, e.g., NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., supra note 168 (describing how Roussel-




A. The People Involved
1. The Plaintiffs
The plaintiff class in a class action must be defined strategically and
selected carefully to survive the certification process.1 72 As a general
rule, the broader the class, the harder it will be to meet the prerequisites
for certification. Therefore, in the Big Abortion context, a national class
may be too big, while a narrower, state class may survive certification.
Similarly, the lead plaintiffs for a Big Abortion class should be selected
carefully.' Kjolsrud demonstrated that a lead plaintiff must clearly have
suffered harm under the alleged theories of liability or the suit will fail.
174
2. The Defendants
The strategic thinking required to define the plaintiff class and select
the lead plaintiffs is also required to choose the defendants. The Big
Tobacco litigation focused on the Big Six tobacco companies, 75 who
together generate billions of dollars in revenue a year and account for
the majority of cigarettes consumed in America. 76 Contrast this to Big
Abortion, which has one central player, Planned Parenthood, and
hundreds of smaller players.' 7 By itself, Planned Parenthood would be
the Big Six of abortion. A large-scale abortion class action would almost
certainly be directed, if not exclusively, then substantially, at Planned
Parenthood.
3. The Lawyers
When it comes to plaintiffs' lawyers, one is looking for lawyers who are
willing to collaborate and invest financially in the litigation." Big
Tobacco plaintiffs' lawyers learned that by coordinating with each other
172. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-52 (5th Cir. 1996)
(decertifying the class created by the trial court for failure to appropriately analyze the
predominance and superiority elements of certification).
173. See discussion infra note 236.
174. See Kjolsrud v. MKB Mgmt. Corp., 669 N.W.2d 82, 88 (N.D. 2003) (affirming
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint because she did not suffer any harm from the brochure
that she claimed stated false information about the ABC link).
175. See, e.g., Castano, 84 F.3d at 737 n.3. The Big Six are American, Brown &
Williamson, Liggett & Myers, Lorillard, Philip Morris, and RJ Reynolds. TURSI ET AL.,
supra note 39, at 90-91.
176. See, e.g., Shirley A. Lazo, Show Me The Money, BARRON'S, Aug. 30, 2004, at 25
(noting that "Reynolds American has a 32% market share, versus 50% for Altria's Philip
Morris unit"); Vanessa O'Connell, Altria Profit Falls 43% As It Pays Price for Cigarette
Promotions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2003, at B5 (stating Philip Morris' 2003 third quarter
revenue of $4.44 billion was from 48.9 billion cigarette units sold).
177. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
178. See Erichson, supra note 56, at 131.
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and heavily investing their own resources, they could overcome the
advantages the Big Six defendants used to defeat individual plaintiffs. 9
Similarly, Big Abortion lawyers must be prepared to collaborate and
invest.""
4. The Experts
Finally, experts play a crucial role in mass tort litigation. 8 Some
experts testify in dozens of similar cases, giving them trial experience, but
also opening the door for questioning their motives. 182 Because expert
testimony is essential to mass tort litigation and because experts testify in
many cases, the selection of expert witnesses is a vital part of the
strategic coordination of plaintiffs' lawyers. 83
B. The Law at Issue
1. The Causes of Action
The causes of action that could arise in the Big Abortion context may
share similarities with the Big Tobacco causes of action. Castano's main
factual premise was that the tobacco companies withheld information
about the addictive nature of nicotine. 84 One of the main premises
behind a Big Abortion class action might be that abortion providers
knew or should have known that abortion causes severe psychological
problems or breast cancer and the providers should have disclosed this
risk to women obtaining abortions.1
5
In contrast to Big Tobacco, the central cause of action against Big
Abortion would most likely be medical malpractice for lack of informed
consent."" Informed consent actions are governed by specific duties of
179. See id. at 123-32; see also Rabin, supra note 36, at 867-68. The $6,000,000
investment made by law firms into the Castano class fueled the litigation and helped turn
the tide of the defendant advantage. Erichson, supra note 56, at 131.
180. See supra notes 57, 61-69 and accompanying text.
181. See PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, MASS TORT LITIGATION § 11:2, at 11-3 (1996)
("Virtually every MTL has been deeply involved with scientific testimony of a medical or
technological nature. . . . [1]t is the nature of the mass tort to intensify, perhaps to
aggravate, the usual problems with expert testimony and scientific proof.").
182. See Susan Finch, Big Tobacco's Lawyers Have Their Turn; Expert's Motive
Questioned in Class-Action Suit, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 29, 2003, at A-2.
183. Cf Erichson, supra note 56, at 131 (discussing the positive effects of coordinating
litigation efforts).
184. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996).
185. Cf Marie v. McGreevey, 314 F.3d 136, 139-40 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that a lack of
informed consent and a "cause of action for the emotional injuries suffered" by women
who have abortions could be valid causes of action under New Jersey law).
186. See 3 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW § 25:34 (2d ed.
2002) (describing the general requirements of informed consent).
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care that doctors owe to their patients, and these standards are
jurisdictionally dependent,187 another reason to avoid creating a national,
Castano-like class.' The informed consent cause of action may lead to
claims of negligence, 8 9 fraud,' ° "[m]ental or emotional injury,"'
9 as well
as statutory claims,1 92 such as those brought in Kjolsrud and Bernardo
under consumer protection statutes.'9 3
In a traditional informed consent action, an individual plaintiff
presents proof of the elements as they relate to that plaintiff.194 However,
the class action context presents new challenges for this action, just as
Castano raised a "novel and wholly untested theory" for holding Big
Tobacco liable.'9 Although it is impossible to predict how the law will
react to a Big Abortion class action, it is possible to identify the elements
of that action: lack of informed consent, causation, and injury.' 96
187. See id. §§ 25:45-:46 (describing professional and lay standards used by different
jurisdictions).
188. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 740-44 (finding lack of analysis of state law variances in
multi-jurisdiction litigation a reason to decertify the class). A national Big Abortion mass
tort with a medical malpractice cause of action would face serious choice of law decisions
based on the differences between the professional and lay standards for medical
malpractice. See 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 186, §§ 25:45-46.
189. See 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 186, § 25:38; supra text accompanying note 60.
190. See 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 186, § 25:38; supra text accompanying note 60.
191. 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 186, § 32:2; supra text accompanying note 60.
192. See 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 186, § 25:38; 4 id. § 32:2.
193. Compare Kjolsrud v. MKB Mgmt. Corp., 669 N.W.2d 82, 83 (N.D. 2003)
(concerning an alleged violation of a North Dakota false advertising statute), and
Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197, 204 (Ct. App. 2004)
(concerning an alleged violation of California's unfair competition and false advertising
laws), with Castano, 84 F.3d at 737 (concerning an alleged violation of state consumer
protection statutes).
194. 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 186, § 25.35. Traditionally,
[t]o establish a prima facie case of failure to comply with the informed
consent requirement, the plaintiff must prove:
-The existence of a material risk unknown to the patient;
-Failure to disclose that risk;
-Causation, i.e. that disclosure of the risk would have lead a reasonable




195. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 737.
196. See supra note 194. Mass tort actions typically involve products liability, while an
action against Big Abortion would be based upon medical malpractice. Cf 32B AM. JUR.
2D Federal Courts § 1863 (1996) (discussing mass tort litigation and class certification in
the context of products liability). However, the characteristics of a Big Abortion suit
make mass tort law a useful model for analyzing causes of action. Cf RHEINGOLD, supra
note 181, §§ 1:1-8.
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First, plaintiffs must prove lack of informed consent.' 9  Lack of
informed consent means that a material risk existed, and the defendant
did not disclose that risk to the plaintiff.9 The duty to disclose a risk
varies by jurisdiction.'99 Because plaintiffs might lack the resources to
prove this duty for each woman's situation, plaintiffs might need to
convince the court to depart from traditional medical malpractice law. °
Plaintiffs must argue that all Big Abortion defendants knew or should
have known of the risk of harm and chose to ignore or hide that risk.2'
Plaintiffs must also argue that abortion providers had a duty to disclose
the risk regardless of the individual plaintiffs situation.
Second, plaintiffs must establish causation, sometimes referred to as
proximate causation. 0 2 Causation is established when it is shown that the
plaintiff would not have had the medical procedure if the risk had been
disclosed.0 3 In some jurisdictions, this standard is based on what the
actual plaintiff would have done, and in other jurisdictions it is based on
what a reasonable patient faced with the plaintiff's circumstances would
have done.2"4 The best argument for the plaintiffs might be that under
the latter standard, any reasonable woman would have refused to have
an abortion, knowing the risk involved, regardless of what any particular
woman's circumstances were. However, this element is difficult to satisfy
in the class action context because it is traditionally plaintiff-specific.
2 0 5
197. See 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 186, § 25:35 (outlining the elements of an
informed consent action).
198. See id. § 25:35.
199. Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to General Measure of
Physician's Duty To Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R.3D 1008,
§2(a) (2004). The traditional approach for what constitutes a material risk that must be
disclosed is a physician-based "professional medical standard," but some states allow a
patient-based standard. Id.
200. See id. (specifying that under traditional medical malpractice law, a plaintiff has
to prove "[tlhe existence of a material risk unknown to the patient," "[f]ailure to disclose
that risk," and "that disclosure of the risk would have lead a reasonable patient to reject
the medical procedure").
201. Cf. supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (explaining the argument in Big
Tobacco litigation that the defendants knew and failed to disclose nicotine's addictive
quality).
202. See 3 LEE & LIN[AHL, supra note 186, § 25:35 ("(D]isclosure of the risk would
have led a reasonable patient to reject the medical procedure or chose a different course
of treatment."); Frantz, supra note 199, § 2(b).
203. See 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 186, § 25:35.
204. See Frantz, supra note 199, § 2(b).
205. See id. ("[E]vidence that the particular patient would not have consented to the
treatment had he known of the undisclosed risk will be essential in some jurisdictions and




Finally, plaintiffs must establish injury. Plaintiffs must prove that
207
abortion harmed them by causing or contributing to their injuries.
Injury divides plaintiffs into two groups: (1) those who experienced
actual harm, such as psychological trauma or breast cancer and (2) those
who have not yet experienced harm but are subject to an increased risk
of future harm."8 Plaintiffs have yet to convince courts that an increased
209
risk of future harm warrants recovery.
A standard informed consent medical malpractice action focuses on
proof of individual harm, but plaintiffs in an abortion class action must
convince the court that it should accept epidemiological proof.2
0 As
mass tort law continues to become more accepting of epidemiological
evidence to prove causation, better chances will exist to establish a causal
link between abortion and the harm to women who obtain abortions2"
Although critics might argue that traditional tort law is unreceptive to
actions like the one just described, several points warrant against quick
dismissal. First, class action litigation and mass tort law are evolving to
allow new theories of liability based on social concerns, such as the
tobacco health crisis.2 2 Second, legislative changes can rapidly alter the
development of tort law."' An example of such legislation is the
Louisiana statute that provides a civil cause of action to women who
have had abortions.1 4 This statute is particularly effective because the
206. See 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 186, § 25:35.
207. See id.
208. See supra notes 106-24 and accompanying text. If the proof shows that abortion
does cause psychological problems or breast cancer, then women who had an abortion but
have not yet suffered harm could face an increased risk of future harm. See, e.g.,
Shadigian, supra note 102, at 63-64.
209. Compare Geoffrey P. Kirshbaum, Comment, Increased Risk of Disease As an
Independent Cause of Action in Toxic Tort Cases, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 273, 274-76, 278-79
(2001) (elaborating on the reluctance of traditional tort law to recognize the tort of
increased risk of future harm and proposing solutions within the toxic tort context), with
Shirley K. Duffy, "Risk Assessment":" A Methodology for Deciding Claims for Increased
Risk of Cancer, 11 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 213, 213-14, 249-50 (2003) (arguing that equity
should motivate courts to use risk assessment to compensate plaintiffs for increased risk of
harm in toxic tort cases).
210. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 181, § 11:4. Individual proof that abortion caused
injury in each particular plaintiff would become prohibitively expensive.
211. Cf Roger S. Fine & Theodore M. Grossman, Mass Torts, in 4 SUCCESSFUL
PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 73:7 (Robert L. Haig ed.,
2003) (discussing the increased use of epidemiological proof in mass tort cases, where
courts are "[c]onfronted with claims that many individuals have been injured by a product,
but where the precise mechanism of causation is unknown").
212. See id. § 73:6 (suggesting that mass tort litigation has evolved in the face of
changes in the community tolerance of risk).
213. See, e.g., supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
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legislature defined damages broadly, defined the informed consent
defense narrowly, and precluded other medical malpractice law from
applying. 21' Third, while courts have rejected previous attempts to bring
class actions in Kjolsrud, Bernardo, and McGreevey,16 the Third Circuit
in McGreevey acknowledged the potential for state law tort claims based
21on those plaintiffs' allegations. 
Finally, the Big Abortion cause of action that most resembles Big
Tobacco litigation would be a products liability action against
manufacturers and distributors of RU-486, alleging that the drug is
211defective because it causes unacceptable side effects in consumers.
2. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (Class Action Act) went into
effect on February 18, 2005.219 The Class Action Act affects many aspects
of class action litigation, from jurisdiction to attorneys' fees.22°
The Class Action Act allows a party to remove state class actions to
federal court if the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy is at
least $5 million.221 This change is expected to allow defendants to remove
nationwide class actions filed in state court to federal court, where they
are likely to be dismissed."' This is a setback for potential Big Abortion
plaintiffs because the Class Action Act is likely to make it difficult to
keep class actions in state court, where plaintiffs had more success in the
Big Tobacco litigation.23
215. See supra note 153.
216. See supra Part I.B.3.
217. See Marie v. McGreevey, 314 F.3d 136, 139 (3d Cir. 2002). The Third Circuit
explained that "[e]ach of the women plaintiffs contends she had an abortion without fully
understanding the procedure." Id. The court continued, "[a]t least one plaintiff claims to
have been threatened and coerced into having an abortion." Id. The court concluded that
"[t]hese allegations would seem to give rise to certain state-law causes of action." Id.
218. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability §§ 1, 3, 7, 8 (1997) (introducing the
products liability doctrine and noting in Section 7 that "[t]he general requirements
concerning the necessity of proving defectiveness or harmfulness in a products liability
action have been applied to cases involving ... (8) drugs or medicines"); supra notes 125-
32 and accompanying text. Further discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
219. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.A. (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-57)).
220. See PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, MASS TORT LITIGATION § 8:5.3 (Supp. 2005)
(discussing changes brought about by the Class Action Act).
221. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-57).
222. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 220, § 8:5.3 (discussing changes brought about by the
Class Action Act).
223. See supra notes 64-69.
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Another reform is that attorneys' fees are more restricted in
settlements. 22 4 This reform should not impact Big Abortion litigation
because it addresses coupon settlements, rather than traditional tort
damages. 5
Finally, the Class Action Act creates federal district court jurisdiction
for a new class of cases called "mass actions., 26 The definition of a mass
action is imprecise, and it is unclear how mass actions could affect future
mass tort litigation.2 ' Time is needed to assess the extent of the new
legislation's impact on class action litigation.228
3. The Prerequisites for Certification
One of the first major procedural hurdles that class actions face is
certification. 229 The Class Action Act makes it more likely that a Big
Abortion class action would end up in federal court, where Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would apply]. ° Additionally,
because many states use class action rules similar to Rule 23, that rule
provides a useful model for analyzing how the prerequisites and
requirements for certification might apply to a Big Abortion class action
suit. 21' Therefore, this Comment next considers the prerequisites and
requirements for Rule 23 certification.
All federal class actions must satisfy the four prerequisites of Rule
23(a) for certifying a class: "numerosity, commonality, typicality, ande . ,,232 th Bi
adequacy of representation. In the Big Abortion context, numerosity
224. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712, 1713 (imposing strict requirements on the awarding of
attorneys' fees in coupon settlements and requiring the trial judge to evaluate whether a
class member will have to pay more in attorneys' fees than the class member received as a
settlement).
225. Id. § 1712.
226. Id. § 1332(d)(11) (defining "mass action" as "any civil action . . . in which
monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the
ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact").
227. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 220, § 8:5.3 (noting that key terms in the definition
of "mass action" are undefined and speculating about the impact of mass actions on mass
tort actions).
228. See id. (admitting the difficulty of predicting the Class Action Act's impact on
class actions and suggesting that the Class Action Act would not impact mass torts that are
separate from class actions).
229. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing,
on interlocutory appeal, the district court's certification of the class).
230. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 220, § 8:5.3 (describing how the Class Action Act
allows for removal of state class actions meeting certain minimum requirements).
231. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 181, § 3:100 (noting that many state courts have
patterned their class action laws after Rule 23); Kearns, supra note 58, at 1343 n.33 ("Most
states have adopted Rule 23 almost verbatim.").
232. See Kearns, supra note 58, at 1359.
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most likely could be satisfied in many, but not all, states.233 On the other
hand, the commonality of claims requirement is called the "battleground
on mass tort class action proposals" because persuasive arguments
usually can be made for and against commonality. 4 Next, "[t]ypicality
means that the named parties are typical of the other plaintiffs in the
class,"' 5 if plaintiffs' lawyers choose the named plaintiffs carefully, they
236should satisfy this element . Finally, "adequacy of representation," the
233. See 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1810 (1996) (suggesting that, while a class
must be large enough "to make joinder impractical," the class must not be so large as to
make necessary tasks, such as notification of class members, impractical). A million-
member class has been considered acceptable where "the issues involved are few and
simple, the identities of members of the class are readily available from the defendant's
records, and the amount to which each class member is entitled may readily be
determined." Id.
Under the Big Tobacco framework, a million-strong class "clearly met the numerosity
requirement," but raised "questions [concerning] the practicability, or mere possibility, of
a statewide or nationwide tobacco class action," because of its massive size. Kearns, supra
note 58, at 1359-60. In comparison, the annual number of statewide abortions in the year
2000 ranged from 236,060 reported abortions in California to 100 reported abortions in
Wyoming. Finer & Henshaw, supra note 158, at 9 tbl.2. The number of reported
abortions for approximately half of the states fell between 12,270 and 164,630 abortions.
See id. (listing, for the year 2000, Kansas as reporting 12,270 abortions and New York as
reporting 164,630 abortions, with 23 other states in between these figures).
234. RHEINGOLD, supra note 181, § 3:5 (highlighting the reality that "[j]udges are ...
capable of giving differing interpretations to mass torts on the commonality
requirement"). Instead of emphasizing the similarities between the actions, judges often
"cite[] the disparate facts and law as standing in the way of determining that commonality
is met." Id. Big Abortion plaintiffs could emphasize the inherent commonalities in one or
more of the three medical concerns from abortion: the psychological effects, the ABC link,
and the harmful side effects of RU-486. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
Defendants would point to "injury and damages" as areas of difference between class
members. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 181, § 3:5.
235. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 181, § 3:6 ("Typicality means that the named parties
are typical of the other plaintiffs in the class.").
236. See id. Typicality is a matter of strategy -selecting a plaintiff that has the "typical
injury." See id. One of the strategic failures in Kjolsrud was that the plaintiff was not
"typical"; she "had not read the [abortion] brochures" upon which she based her case. See
Kjolsrud v. MKB Mgmt. Corp., 669 N.W.2d 82, 88 (N.D. 2003); supra notes 133-39 and
accompanying text.
Beyond the strategic failure in Kjolsrud, it is worth considering how medical science
could affect typicality. For example, the typical plaintiff in Big Abortion might be a
female who has breast cancer. See supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text. If the
plaintiffs' claim is that they were not informed of the risk of losing the protective effect
that giving birth at a young age might offer them against developing breast cancer, then
the class should include women who had an abortion at an early age, and the lead plaintiff
should be one of them. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. If the class includes
women who had their first abortion later in life, typicality would be defeated because the
abortions could not have caused them to lose the protective effect that giving birth at a
young age provides. See id. Therefore, plaintiffs' attorneys should consider carefully how
medical science affects both typicality and the dimensions of the class.
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fourth prerequisite of Rule 23(a), asks whether "the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
2 37
The answer is likely to be in the affirmative for Big Abortion, but
satisfying this requirement may involve political wrangling among
plaintiffs and between plaintiffs' lawyers. 8
4. The Requirements for Certification
Once the certification prerequisites are met, the class must also satisfy
certification requirements in Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which articulates three types of classes.239 Plaintiffs' lawyers
might argue for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification because it allows the* 1 240
class to be defined broadly.
A Rule 23(b)(3) class must meet predominance and superiority•241
requirements. Under the predominance requirement, the court must
decide whether "questions common to the class predominate over
questions affecting individual members.,1 42  Under the superiority
requirement, the court must decide whether a class action is better than• -• 243
other possible forms of adjudication. Rule 23(b)(3) includes four non-
exclusive factors which courts should consider when deciding whether to
certify the class.2  In the Big Abortion context, it appears that the
factors could support a finding of predominance and superiority, but
237. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4); see also Kearns, supra note 58, at 1359, 1361 ("The
adequacy of representation requirement inquires into both the competence of class
counsel and the existence of any conflicts of interest between class representatives and
absentee members.").
238. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 181, § 3:7. Big Abortion litigation would require
substantial funding. Cf. supra notes 49, 57 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
finances in Big Tobacco). Therefore, it is again worthwhile to recognize that only with
proper coordination would plaintiffs' attorneys be likely to overcome any defendant
advantage. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (attributing part of plaintiffs'
success in Big Tobacco litigation to the coordination of the plaintiffs' attorneys).
239. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b); Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines,
Deciding To Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United
States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1531, 1540 (2000).
240. See Solimine & Hines, supra note 239, at 1541-42; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
241. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); 32B AM. JtJR. 2D Federal Courts § 1978 (1996). A Rule
23(b)(3) class action is subject to other requirements, such as the notice requirement
under Rule 23(c)(2). See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 2055
(1996).
242. 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1981 (1996).
243. Id. ("The superiority requirement does not mean simply that a class action device
must be adequate, but rather that such device must be superior to, and not just as good as,
other methods for fair and efficient adjudication of a controversy.").
244. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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courts may consider additional factors that could weigh against
245certification.
C. The Strategic Conditions Necessary for Success
One lesson to learn from Kjolsrud and Bernardo is that for Big
Abortion class actions to succeed, a number of strategic conditions must
146 scedbe favorable . To succeed, Big Abortion litigants must consider the
state of science, the development of class action law, and the political
climate.
245. See 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 2009 (1996) (noting that the four "factors
are only suggestive, and not exhaustive of the factors that should be considered in deciding
whether to allow a class action under FED. R. Civ P 23(b)(3)").
The first factor to consider is "the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
Here this interest could be outweighed by the potential benefits of strategic litigation. As
in the Big Tobacco context, strategic litigation would require capitalization by and
coordination among plaintiffs' attorneys. Cf. supra notes 61-62.
The second factor is "the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B).
Few suits concerning this factor have been filed in the United States. See, e.g., Margaret
E. Vroman, Annotation, Medical Malpractice in Performance of Legal Abortion, 69
A.L.R.4TH 875, §§ 1-10 (2004) (assembling "cases in which the courts have specifically
addressed the issue of physician malpractice as a result of the performance, or attempted
performance, of a therapeutic or otherwise legally sanctioned abortion").
The third factor is "the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(C). Here, the difficulty that
the Castano plaintiffs faced because their claims were multi-jurisdictional could be
mitigated by bringing only a state-wide class action, thereby minimizing variations in state
law. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-44 (5th Cir. 1996) ("In a multi-
state class action, variations in state law may swamp any common issues and defeat
predominance.").
The final factor is "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). This is a pragmatic inquiry that "involves the
weighing of the judicial efficiency or benefits the class action will produce against the
corresponding administrative complexity that may arise." 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal
Courts § 2014 (1996). One benefit may be that funding by the attorneys may allow more
plaintiffs to bring their claims. See Erichson, supra note 56, at 131.
246. See discussion infra Parts II.C.1 -3. Kjolsrud and Bernardo are prime examples of
cases in which strategic conditions were unfavorable, leading to an unsatisfactory
outcome. See Kjolsrud v. MKB Mgmt. Corp., 669 N.W.2d 82, 83-84, 87-88 (N.D. 2003)
(holding plaintiff lacked standing); Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d
197, 204, 211, 219-20, 235 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the challenged speech was
protected by First Amendment). In both cases, plaintiffs lost at the trial and appellate
level on issues that might have been addressed before filing the litigation. See Kjolsrud,
669 N.W.2d at 83-84, 87-88; Bernardo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 204, 211, 219-20, 235. If Kjolsrud
had been brought by a different plaintiff and if Bernardo had used better scientific
evidence of the ABC link and brought a claim that was not protected by the First
Amendment, then the outcomes of these cases might have been different. See Kjolsrud,
669 N.W.2d at 83-84, 87-88; Bernardo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 204, 211, 219-20, 235.
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1. The State of Science
As Bernardo demonstrates, a Big Abortion class action can only
succeed if the science is settled.47 By way of analogy, the 1964 Report
stated conclusively that smoking caused lung cancer, 48 but it did not
resolve issues of causation and damages for individual plaintiffs at
subsequent trials. 9 Currently, the ABC link is too tenuous to support a
class action, but the medical literature on psychological problems linked
to abortion is stronger, if not yet complete enough, to warrant a class
210
action.2
2. The Development of Class Action Law
Big Abortion litigants must monitor class action law for both judicial
and legislative developments and adapt accordingly. When facing
judicial opposition, Big Abortion litigants should remember how, during
the third wave of Big Tobacco litigation, plaintiffs' lawyers found ways
around unfavorable appellate rulings. 5  Plaintiffs' attorneys also must
monitor legislative and judicial developments in class action law.252
Republican proposals to cap medical malpractice tort damages are a
recent example.253 Paradoxically, because many Republican legislators
are antiabortion, they may wish to modify or delay damage caps to allow
Big Abortion litigation to proceed unimpeded. 4
247. Bernardo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 219, 219-21. When Bernardo was decided, the court
declared "the claimed ABC link [is] a matter of genuine scientific debate," and
consequently, plaintiff could not prevail. Id.
248. See PUB. HEALTH SERV., supra note 34, at 37.
249. See, e.g., Castano, 84 F.3d at 737. For example, the Castano suit focused on the
addictive nature of nicotine and the way tobacco companies manipulated nicotine content,
facts that remained hidden from plaintiffs until the 1990s. Id.; cf. OFFICE ON SMOKING &
HEALTH, supra note 42, at 17, 257-58.
250. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
251. Erichson, supra note 56, at 123-24.
252. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.A. (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-57))
(reforming class action law); see also Donald W. Ricketts, The Ebb and Flow of Class
Action Lawsuits, L.A. LAW., June 2004, at 12, 14-16 (discussing the development of class
action law in California and the Class Action Fairness Act that passed the House in 2003
but never reached a vote in the Senate).
253. See Sarah Avery, AMA's New Leader Likes Odds for Liability Reform, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh), Nov. 15, 2004, at lB.
254. See Bill Broadway, Religious Views Polarize Congress Moderates Lack Voice,
Survey of Voting Finds, J. GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Sept. 18, 2004, at iC (counting
eighty percent of Republican senators and representatives in 1996 among those opposed
to abortion).
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3. The Political Climate
Big Abortion litigants must also understand how politics can play a key
role in litigation, as it has in Big Tobacco litigation."' 5 Politics affect when
and how the government becomes involved in a social issue, such as
smoking or abortion .2' Government involvement, for example, was one
of the factors that turned the tide against Big Tobacco.2 ' The wild card
in the Big Abortion political process is the impending nomination of new
Supreme Court justices, which could alter the constitutional protection
258currently afforded the right to abortion.
III. WHY MASS TORT CLASS ACTION LITIGATION SHOULD BE USED TO
REFORM SOCIAL POLICY IN THE ABORTION CONTEXT
If one believes Big Abortion litigation is a possibility, the question that
must still be answered is "why?" The "why" question has both a
practical and a theoretical component. The practical question is "why
would Big Abortion mass tort litigation reform social policy?" The
theoretical question is "why should anti-abortion advocates turn to Big
Abortion mass tort litigation to reform social policy?"
A. The Practical "Why?"
1. Government Involvement
First, Big Abortion class action litigation may motivate more• • 259
government involvement. When Big Tobacco litigation took off in the
1990s, many states and the federal government became involved in
creating reforms, including those in the states' MSA. G° If Big Abortion
class action litigation is successful, the federal government and many
states, eager to pass legislation restricting abortion, might participate in
255. See Little, supra note 72, at 1166-71.
256. See id. In the third wave of Big Tobacco litigation, state attorneys general chose
to pursue Medicaid recovery claims against the tobacco companies on behalf of their
states. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
257. See Little, supra note 72, at 1166-71; supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
258. See Brian Kates, Bet on Prez To Reshape High Court, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 4,
2004, at 19 (noting predictions that Bush's Supreme Court nomination or nominations will
alter the balance of power, leading to "radical changes in such pivotal areas as... abortion
rights"). Both abortion rights and antiabortion advocates have predicted how President
Bush's re-election may change the composition of the Supreme Court. See Savage, supra
note 93.
259. See supra notes 70-73, 254-57 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. The states' MSA was instrumental
in obtaining social policy reforms, such as restricting advertising and helping people to quit
smoking. See OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, supra note 42, at 193.
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shaping new reforms.16' Government involvement might take the form of
new restrictions on abortion or government lawsuits to recover Medicaid
costs attributable to abortion, similar to Big Tobacco government
lawsuits.262
2. Settling for Money
While plaintiffs' attorneys must enter class action litigation prepared to
take the case to trial, the optimum result is a settlement due to the risks
of losing at the trial and appellate levels. 263 Big Abortion settlements
would be substantially smaller than those obtained in the Big Tobacco
litigation, but could still reach into the millions of dollars.
64
3. Social Policy Reforms
Arguably, to be effective, Big Abortion litigation should create social
261policy reform. With Big Tobacco litigation, some reform came from
26concrete agreements in the MSA, while the indirect effect of the
massive settlements against the Big Six was to raise cigarette prices,
thereby decreasing consumption of cigarettes. Big Abortion litigation
might have a similar double effect in (1) establishing concrete social
261. See, e.g., Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West Supp.
2004); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875-79 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). Governmental willingness to enact abortion restrictions and
subsequently defend them against constitutional challenges makes it more likely that
government would try to participate in new reforms. Cf supra note 92.
262. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. If Big Abortion class actions lead
to verdicts based upon the negative health consequences of abortion, such as psychological
harm, these civil litigation verdicts might provide government a new, stronger health
rationale to restrict abortion, leading to Big Tobacco-like reforms such as tighter
advertising laws and programs to provide alternatives to abortion. See supra notes 71-77
and accompanying text. Moreover, private Big Abortion class actions might motivate
federal and state government to pursue their own recovery suits, as they did against Big
Tobacco. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
263. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 181, § 14:1 ("Most tort cases settle. Most mass tort
litigations (MTLs) also settle, probably at a higher rate than tort cases generally."). One
of the lessons of Big Tobacco is that massive jury verdicts might not survive appellate
review. See OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, supra note 33, at 239-41.
264. Compare supra notes 159, 164 and accompanying text with supra notes 66-69, 72,
174 and accompanying text. Although abortion services generate an estimated $487
million annually, Planned Parenthood's revenue of $766.6 million in 2003, exceeded that
figure. See supra notes 159, 164 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 23-28.
266. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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policy reforms' 68 and (2) lowering demand for abortion through higher
269prices.
First, if the parties agree to settle, the settlement terms should include
better disclosure laws explaining the health consequences of abortion.270
Another concession could be related to The Alan Guttmacher Institute,
which claims it is independent 27' but is partially funded by Planned
272Parenthood and advocates for abortion. While no evidence exists
today, litigation might uncover parallels between The Alan Guttmacher
Institute and the Council for Tobacco Research in terms of deception or
failure to disclose information damaging to the abortion industry.2 7
Second, if a verdict or settlement sum is large enough, then, as with
the Big Tobacco litigation, the average cost of an abortion could rise,
which may result in fewer women obtaining abortions. Part of the
increase in cost may come from malpractice insurers, who might raise
rates, forcing providers out of business, which would further limit the
275accessibility of abortion services.
268. Compare Stone, supra note 25, at 472-74 (describing attempts by legislators and
antiabortion advocates to circumvent the constitutional right to an abortion by using tort
law to restrict abortion rights), and Achilles, supra note 25, at 854-60, 880-83 (discussing
the Louisiana state legislature's Act 825, which imposes tort liability on abortion
providers, impeding the availability of abortion services and, thereby, the right to an
abortion), with supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
269. Compare Finer & Henshaw, supra note 159, at 16 (explaining that "[b]esides
distance from a provider, cost is the most obvious tangible barrier [to obtaining an
abortion]"), with supra note 76. For many reasons, the majority of women pay out-of-
pocket for abortion-related expenses. Finer & Henshaw, supra note 159, at 23. Only
about twenty-six percent of abortions are covered by Medicaid or private insurance. See
id. at 20 tbl.3. Big Tobacco raised prices to pay for its settlements, and this would be a
logical method for Big Abortion to recoup settlement costs. See Tara Parker-Pope, Major
Tobacco Companies Increase Cigarette Prices by Five Cents a Pack, WALL ST. J., May 12,
1998, at B12. However, the demand for cigarettes is highly resilient to price increases, and
it is not clear whether abortion would follow this pattern or prove more or less responsive
to price increases. Compare id., with Finer & Henshaw, supra note 159, at 16.
270. For example, the settlement terms could require doctors to describe in detail the
psychological harm that some women have faced after getting an abortion. See supra
notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
271. See THE ALAN GUTFrMACHER INSTITUTE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at
http://www.agi-usa.org/about/faq.html (last visited November 19, 2004) (defending its own
objectivity by stating "The Alan Guttmacher Institute neither accepts direct project
support from profit-making organizations that might benefit from its findings nor allows
specific funding agencies to influence its agenda").
272. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
273. Compare supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text, with supra notes 44-45, 71,
75 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 76, 269 and accompanying text.
275. See Marilyn Werber Serafini, Still Counting Votes on Malpractice Caps, 36 NAT'L
J. 3450, 3450 (2004). Many Republican legislators and some doctors blame medical
malpractice lawsuits for sharp increases in the cost of malpractice insurance. Id. Some
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B. The Theoretical "Why?"
As a matter of theory, the antiabortion movement should care about
Big Abortion litigation. Judge Casey's opinion in National Abortion
Federation highlights the current challenge the antiabortion movement
276
faces. As long as Casey is controlling precedent, a constitutional fence
surrounds state and federal legislatures that try to restrict or prohibit
abortion.,7   Meanwhile, abortion rights advocates will continue
attempting to build that fence by vetting judges for their positions on
abortion and fiercely opposing antiabortion nominees)7. Thirty-one
years after Roe, a reading of Judge Casey's opinion might convince one
that the constitutional fence appears impenetrable.7 9 Therefore, it is
time for the antiabortion movement to consider how it might dig under
the constitutional fence through civil, non-constitutional litigation.2 8
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's opinion in Stenberg compelled Judge Casey to
find the 2003 Ban unconstitutional. The decision should not surprise
antiabortion advocates, because it is consistent with a recurring cycle in
the abortion debate. Legislatures enact statutes restricting or prohibiting
certain types of abortion, and judges find the legislation unconstitutional.
Now, the antiabortion movement must consider alternatives to reform
social policy. Big Tobacco litigation provides one of these alternatives:
mass tort class action litigation. Although some aspects of Big Abortion
litigation need further development, particularly the medical science, if
Big Tobacco litigation offers a glimmer of hope to antiabortion
advocates, it is that soon it may be time to take on Big Abortion.
Republicans further argue that the rising costs are to blame for a physician shortages. Id.
Meanwhile, some Democrats blame the insurance industry. Id. The Alan Guttmacher
Institute explains that "[a]lthough it is difficult to measure the impact of the accessibility
of abortion services on abortion incidence, lack of access likely prevents some women
from terminating unintended pregnancies." Finer & Henshaw, supra 159, at 16.
276. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 439, 492-93 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
277. See supra notes 1-24 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., Evelyn Nieves, Abortion Rights Said To Be at a Crossroads, WASH.
POST, Nov. 19, 2004, at A27 (predicting an abortion rights "battle" over Supreme Court
nominations).
279. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 492.
280. See supra note 25.
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